HS2’s reset: turning a new baseline into delivery confidence

HS2’s reset gives the programme something it has needed for some time: a clearer baseline. 

Government has now set out revised cost and schedule ranges, with first services between Old Oak Common and Birmingham Curzon Street expected between 2036 and 2039, and the full route to Euston and the West Coast Main Line connection expected between 2040 and 2043. The programme is now forecast to cost between £87.7 billion and £102.7 billion. 

That clarity is useful. But it is only the starting point. 

A reset does not create value by itself. Value will come from what happens next: disciplined delivery, clear trade-offs, credible sequencing, and a firm focus on the capacity and connectivity benefits HS2 is meant to unlock. 

Simplify without shrinking the value

The decision to reduce HS2’s maximum operating speed from 360kph to 320kph is a useful example of pragmatic simplification. It reduces technical novelty and testing risk, while HS2 Ltd has said the impact on the Old Oak Common to Birmingham Curzon Street journey time is marginal. 

That looks like good value engineering: reducing complexity without materially weakening the purpose of the railway. 

But not every reduction is value engineering. Some savings protect value; others erode it. A saving that weakens long-term capacity, operability or resilience is a false economy. 

That distinction matters because HS2’s value is not simply about speed. It is about capacity, reliability, released capacity on the existing network, and the wider economic benefits created by better-connected places. 

The question should not simply be: can this be built for less? 

It should be: what is the lowest-cost version of HS2 that still does the job? 

Align delivery around the outcome

HS2’s biggest risks now sit at the boundaries: Euston, Old Oak Common, Curzon Street, Handsacre Junction, and the wider network. 

These are not technical loose ends. They are where value is either unlocked or lost. 

Passengers will experience HS2 as an end-to-end railway: frequency, reliability, crowding, interchange, journey time and resilience. Local areas will judge it by whether it supports regeneration, housing, employment and investment. Those outcomes depend on integration, not just asset completion. 

There is a useful comparison with Crossrail. It was also affected by delay, cost pressure and difficult systems integration, but the Elizabeth line is now widely recognised for the value it brings to London’s transport network. The lesson is not that overruns should be excused. It is that value is ultimately realised when a programme moves from construction into reliable operation. 

The same applies to the supply chain. Suppliers need stable decisions, clear priorities and credible sequencing. In return, the programme needs sharper incentives, stronger productivity management and clearer accountability for outcomes. 

HS2 is not just an infrastructure story. It is a test of whether a major programme can recover by changing how it delivers.